by Daniel Horwitz
While debating the merits of stricter gun control legislation
in the wake of this month’s tragic massacre in Newtown (see:
GunControl and the Second Amendment), it is essential to remember that there
are actually two separate issues at hand that must each be considered before any
new law is enacted.
The first of these issues – and as you’ve properly pointed
out, the only one that is currently being discussed – is what
should be done to prevent mass shootings
like those we’ve witnessed in places like Newtown, Oak Creek, Aurora and Virginia
Tech from occurring again.
Though of
critical importance (
there havebeen 181 school shootings alone since Columbine), this is really no more
than a simple public policy question: in sum, what laws, if any, should be
enacted to protect the public from this kind of gun violence going forward?
Several proposals have been offered up that could (potentially)
further this goal.
On the first day of
the new Congressional session, for example, Senator Dianne Feinstein
plansto reintroduce the expired 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban— a bill which, among
other things, would prohibit the manufacture for civilian use of certain
semi-automatic firearms, and would outlaw the sale of what have become known as
“high capacity magazines.”
Alternatively,
Congress could succumb to
pressure toclose the “gun show” loophole, or could require that all firearms be
registered with the Federal government (a measure that
PresidentLyndon Johnson unsuccessfully attempted to enact back in 1968).
In contrast to policies like these, however, organizations
like the NRA and Libertarian Party (which have
heavilycriticized the purported benefits of the above proposals) have instead
suggested that
armingschool officials would be the best way to protect students from future mass
shootings— suggestions for which they have been
criticizedmercilessly in turn.
And on the
other side of this extreme, others still have called for strict and
comprehensive Federal gun control legislation similar to the
successfuland borderline prohibitionary regulatory regime currently employed in Japan.
The second issue, however – and every bit as important, if
not more so – is what can be done. By this I mean the precise consideration that
you have raised: what we as a nation can do about gun violence that would be
constitutionally permissible. Constitutional governance is the essential foundation
upon which our Republic is based, and the Constitution places structural
limits on state and Federal governments that necessarily take certain policy
choices off the table.
Crucially, our commitment to Constitutional governance endures
whether or not new legislation would be desirable from a public policy
standpoint.
Though the vast majority of
us would support laws, for example, that prevent Westboro Baptist Church from picketing
the funerals of slain U.S. service members (or from harassing grieving Sandy
Hook Elementary School parents as they lay their children to rest, as that church
recentlyclaimed it would do), the Supreme Court has nonetheless held that
theFirst Amendment flatly prohibits such legislation.
Similarly, many are distressed whenever a
murderer is set free because police obtained evidence illegally in order to
secure his conviction.
Even so, the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule compels this result, and it will continue
to do so unless it is repealed.
Though the Constitution does not turn a completely blind eye
to public policy considerations (it instead requires that laws infringing upon
fundamental constitutional rights be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest”), certain constitutional rights do trump the government’s
interest in promoting public safety.
And
despite the fact that the Supreme Court neglected to specify a standard of
scrutiny when it decided the issue in 2008, it nonetheless made clear that “the
right to bear arms” guaranteed by the Second Amendment is included among
them.
Thus, even in the face of the incomprehensible
pain caused by the Newtown shooting, and even though – as Justice Scalia
recently observed – “the Second Amendment [may be] outmoded in a society where
our standing army is the pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces
provide personal security, and where gun violence is a serious problem[,]” the
Second Amendment nonetheless forbids Congress from enacting a certain class of gun
control measures— public safety be damned.
Though this may sound extreme, it is really just another iteration
of the classic tension between “liberty” and “security” that has existed in constitutional
jurisprudence for centuries. Like the First and Fourth Amendment examples
above, then, unless the constitutionally-enumerated right to bear arms is
lawfully repealed, “it is not the role of [the Supreme Court] to pronounce the
Second Amendment extinct.” Since nobody
appears ready to launch a national campaign to repeal the Second Amendment,
however (at least not yet), the essential question that remains is which precise
policy choices the Second Amendment prevents Congress from pursuing.
Because the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment doctrine
is only four years old, the full scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee is
not yet entirely clear. In the landmark 2008
case District of Columbia v. Heller, a divided Supreme Court held for
the first time in history that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, as well as a
right to use that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes like self-defense
in the home. Though the decision remains
controversial for several reasons, the Heller Court’s holding that
individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment was
subsequently applied to the nation as a whole in the 2010 case McDonald v. City
of Chicago.
While the purposes underlying the Second Amendment were not
essential to these holdings (according to the Court, the right to bear arms
exists whether or not the original reasons which prompted its enumeration
remain persuasive today), the Heller Court did recognize three distinct reasons
“why the militia was thought to be ‘necessary to the security of a free state’”
when the Second Amendment was ratified.
First, Justice Scalia explained, “it is useful in repelling invasions
and suppressing insurrections.” Second, “it
renders large standing armies unnecessary.”
Third, and along the lines of what you referred to as the “resistance
army in waiting” interest, the Court noted that “when the able-bodied men of a
nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist
tyranny.” This final interest was
discussed further in McDonald, where the Court explained in greater
detail that the 14th Amendment (which was held to apply the Second Amendment to
the states) was enacted in part to put an end to southern states’ “systematic
efforts to disarm and injure African Americans” after the Civil War.
Despite acknowledging that protecting citizens’ ability to
resist tyranny was among the reasons why the right to bear arms was enumerated,
the Supreme Court nonetheless made clear in
Heller that this purpose does
not define the scope of the right
that the Second Amendment confers.
Thus,
citizens are not entitled to the same military-grade weaponry that our service
members enjoy, and as such, will never be able to claim entitlement to weapons
like AK-47s, tanks or stealth-converted Blackhawk helicopters along the lines
of those used to overtake Osama Bin Laden’s compound.
Though the Second Amendment may have been
enacted in part – for purposes of tyrannical deterrence – to help citizens
resist government, it does not give citizens the right to own the artillery
necessary to overthrow it.
As explained
below, however, citizens may indeed claim a constitutional entitlement to
weapons commonly used for self-defense, but at least to this point, that’s about
the full extent of what the Second Amendment protects.
The practical effect of both Heller and McDonald
has been that neither the Federal government nor state governments may prohibit
law-abiding citizens from keeping handguns in their homes for personal
protection, nor enact legislation rendering handguns unusable for that purpose. This specific focus on handguns is not
accidental, and the reasoning that underlies it is important. Expounding upon the holding of the 1939 case United
States v. Miller, the Supreme Court explained in Heller that while the
Second Amendment does protect firearms that are “in common use,” it “does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”
Thus, the Court reasoned, because “handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home . . . a complete prohibition
of their use is invalid.”
Whether one favors the Second Amendment or not, it is
difficult to justify this particular holding.
Which firearms are “in common use” is necessarily a function of which
firearms are legal, and as such, the logic that underlies this premise is
fatally circular. As Justice Breyer
exclaimed in dissent: “On the majority's reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents
a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the
States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes popular Congress will
no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the
majority determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see what
existing regulations permit. There is no basis for believing that the Framers
intended such circular reasoning.” Whatever
the merits of this holding, however, the Supreme Court is vested with final
authority to divine constitutional meaning, and it represents what is currently
the law of the land.
In light of
Heller and
McDonald, then, what
kinds of gun regulations are permissible today?
Blanket prohibitions on keeping handguns for self-defense in the home
are clearly unconstitutional, and the Second Amendment probably confers a right
to carry handguns for self-defense outside the home as well.
(Indeed, just three weeks ago, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Heller and
McDonald compelled
such a result.)
That said, however, the
post-
Heller world has not turned out nearly as well as gun advocates had
hoped.
By January 2, 2009, lower courts
had issued rulings on all manner of gun control regulations, and
accordingto UCLA law professor Adam Winkler, the scoreboard was “Gun Control 60,
Individual Right 0.”
As of December 18,
2012,
SupremeCourt correspondent Adam Liptak further explained that there had been “more
than 500 challenges to gun laws and gun prosecutions since
Heller was
decided, and vanishingly few of them [] succeeded.”
Undoubtedly, these decisions have hinged upon
the following crucial and expansive dicta from
Heller itself:
“[N]othing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms . . . [or] the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’”
With the Constitutional path to stricter gun control legislation
thus relatively (though not entirely) clear, the bulk of the debate can safely
return to public policy.
Whether any of the
proposed measures described in this essay’s introduction will in fact succeed
in reducing gun violence, however, and whether their predicted public policy benefits
outweigh competing concerns (such as the undesirability of restricting
law-abiding citizens’ ability to own guns, making it difficult to hunt
recreationally, inhibiting deterrence, or weakening citizens’ ability to resist
a hypothetical tyrannical government) are questions for your Congressman.
That said, however, I’ll suggest one potential
policy option that,
despitesomewhat persuasive criticism, could be a good place to start:
getguns out of the hands of people who don’t even want to own them, thereby
taking thousands of high-powered weapons off the street without stepping on
anybody else’s toes.
Daniel Horwitz is a third year law student at Vanderbilt University
Law School, where he is the Vice President of Law Students for Social
Justice. He can be contacted at Daniel.a.horwitz@vanderbilt.edu.
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